The 1950s, as is well known, were marked by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, at which First Secretary of the Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev condemned Stalin's personality cult and dissociated himself from the recent past. It is less known that on this occasion there was a real uprising with mass casualties in Tbilisi, loud but now forgotten even in Georgia itself.
On February 25, 1956, Khrushchev made a famous report on the need to combat the cult of personality of Stalin. The report was read in private, so for a long time its real content remained the property of only a small group of functionaries. In this way, the country was trying to protect the country from shock - just that the image of Stalin was sacred and not subject to criticism. However, the actual result was the opposite of what was intended. On the delegates of the Congress Khrushchev's report had the effect of an exploded bomb. Of course, upon their return, they began to retell its contents to the best of their understanding to their loved ones. Soon throughout the Soviet Union rolled waves of gossip and rumors about what was actually contained in the scandalous report. The attitude towards Stalin in society was not so unequivocal even then, but many millions of people really sincerely admired the leader, and were now very discouraged and outraged. In addition, for Georgians, Stalin was not only a statesman, but also a compatriot.
For Georgia, the question of assessing Stalin's personality was understandably particularly painful. Here, the lack of a clear official position, the unspoken but real split within the Communist Party gave ground for a real revolt. The passions were also inflamed by local initiatives: for example, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia forbade laying wreaths at the monument to the late leader.
The ferment was felt even in Moscow. A group of officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB left for Tbilisi to clarify the situation on the spot and restore order.
On March 5, 1956, the anniversary of Stalin's death, a mass of people went to his monument on the bank of the Kura River in Tbilisi. This time the crowd was warmed up by a report, the content of which was not known exactly neither by the protesters, nor even by the Soviet functionaries who tried to calm the crowd. The most emotional were the local students. Such a procession was already familiar, and in 1954, and in 1955 on the day of Stalin's death to his monument laid flowers and wreaths. But this time the matter went beyond all limits. At the rally they shouted slogans against Khrushchev, and even in favor of Georgian independence. The Chekists first tried to calm the crowd by targeting its leaders. One KGB officer went to Makvalla Okropiridze, editor of the newspaper Stalin's Tribe. However, the woman remained adamant: “How can I speak against Joseph Vissarionovich!”
On the same day, the report on the cult of personality became the property of the local Central Committee of the Party. A new wave of rumors provoked even more massive and aggressive demonstrations. Monstrous gossip circulated through the city, including, for example, a delusional rumor that the Chinese could revive Stalin from his ashes. The police began mass arrests and caught almost 400 of the most active demonstrators, but this did not help the cause. On March 7, students of Tbilisi University, followed by a number of other universities and teenagers took to the streets. The police quickly lost control over the situation. The center of the protest was the same monument to Stalin, his enemies were publicly cursed, the number of protesters was off the scale. Soviet flags, portraits of Lenin, Stalin, Marx and... Pushkin were raised above the crowd.
On March 8, the crowd started seizing cars and buses and attacking the police. Chauffeurs who refused to drive the protesters were thrown right into the Kura River, policemen were beaten up. Mass rallies turned into mass fights. The police department was surrounded. The police were demanded to release the detainees. Attempts of the police to repel the transportation failed. Institutions began to close in Tbilisi. Mzhavanadze, the first secretary of the local Communist Party, tried to calm the crowd. He honestly tried to solve the crisis peacefully, and even managed to somewhat reduce the heat of passions. However, this rhetorician had one serious disadvantage: he did not speak Georgian well. His speech caused more laughter - but at least not aggression. Nevertheless, thanks to Mzhavanadze's conciliatory speeches, the spontaneous outrage was somehow brought within bounds and discussion of concrete steps began.
The protesters' demands were generally not extremist. The authorities were offered to declare March 9 (the day of Stalin's funeral) a mourning day, to describe Stalin's life in the press and to show films describing the late leader's activities in cinemas. Some of the demands look simply ridiculous: to raise a balloon with Stalin's portrait over Tbilisi. Separately, the protesters asked to invite a representative of China to the rally: Chinese leaders were known for their sympathy for Stalin. At the suggestion of the Georgian leadership, Chinese military commander Zhu De, who was visiting Tbilisi, did appear, listened to the greetings and received written requests and wishes from the protesters. On March 8 it seemed that the crisis had already been overcome. Moreover, the authorities appeared very pliable and inclined to compromise. Local newspapers published editorials on the anniversary of Stalin's death with pictures of him, permission was granted for mourning rallies, and, in general, the Soviet authorities proved to be far less fierce and intransigent than they had been led to believe. No one could have imagined that the next day a massacre would break out.
From the general crowd of protesters, a significant group of irreconcilables, almost a thousand people, stood out over the next few days. For them, the demands to honor Stalin's memory turned out to be strangely linked to the idea of Georgia's independence. In addition, new people came to Tbilisi, up to two thousand people only from Gori (Stalin's small homeland). The demands instantly changed - the electrified crowd was already demanding the independence of Georgia, there were even calls to “Beat the Armenians!” Finally, there were demands for the resignation of Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan and the republican government. Allegedly, the rebellious crowd was directed by a certain agronomist Kipiani from present-day Tskhinvali, but to all appearances, he turned out to be just a “shooter”: he could not give any clear explanation for his actions afterwards. However, the most radical speakers called for concrete action - the seizure of the Communications House on Rustaveli Avenue. To enhance the atmosphere of grotesque, a car covered with plywood to look like an armored car drove around Tbilisi, on which stood a dressed-up Lenin and Stalin surrounded by the same “revolutionary sailors”. “Lenin” in Georgian shouted ”Glory to the great Stalin!” In Tbilisi, up to forty thousand people had already gathered in the streets. In the end, it was decided to send a group of ten protesters to the House of Communications.
According to one version, the people were going to send a telegram to Molotov, once one of Stalin's most loyal men, who was just having his birthday. According to other sources, they were radicals who wanted to announce Georgia's secession from the USSR. What they didn't know was that a small military detachment with weapons had been brought in for the duration of the riots.
Anyway, a group of a dozen young men broke into the House of Communications, and here the irreparable happened.
Those who entered the building were detained. The crowd outside rushed to the House of Communications to beat back their comrades. The soldiers standing in the cordon were crushed, pressed against the wall. A fight broke out, stones flew from the crowd, someone even fired a pistol several times, in response the soldiers hit the demonstrators with rifle butts. One of the soldiers started firing in the air, with no effect.
Then one of the soldiers was stabbed with a knife. Then the military opened fire to kill.
Around midnight, radicals tried to seize the city police department and weapons, but this attempt was also unsuccessful. However, four cars were stolen from the police. Three were later found, one was drowned in the Kura River. Sporadically, the soldiers tried to take away their automatic rifles, but they acted humanely, if not professionally: they did not give them back, but they did not shoot at the demonstrators either. At the same time, the soldiers were yelled at, called “fascists and Gestapovites,” promised to “destroy the Russians,” and tried to beat the soldiers with rebar and stones. However, the fervor was quickly cooled by shooting into the air. Everyone already realized that the jokes were over. No one defended the barricades that had been built from buses on Rustaveli Avenue.
Arrests began in Tbilisi. Knives, pistols and steel rods were taken from many detainees. Army checkpoints grew throughout the city. Attempts to reassemble demonstrations were thwarted by the military. However, the bulk of those arrested were never prosecuted. For the vast majority of people gathered in the KGB prison, they were interrogated and sent home. Only 39 people were convicted. However, according to official data, 22 participants of the action were killed and 47 were wounded. Some were run over by machinery, some drowned in the cold Kura River. Funerals were held without publicity, with participation of only relatives and friends. There was unrest in other Georgian cities - Kutaisi and Gori, but after the dispersal of the demonstration in Tbilisi, they quickly went home.
The Tbilisi events of 1956 are one of the strangest pages of the history of that time. Of course, it is easy to understand the psychological shock of a sharp reassessment of Stalin's role in the country's history. However, the riots, disobedience to law enforcement agencies and, as the crown of everything, the transition to armed violence, are simply difficult to explain. On the other hand, the Soviet authorities were not on top of things either. First, vague rumors about what was happening in Moscow stirred up the crowd, then it could not be restrained, and eventually blood was spilled. In addition, it turned out that the authorities had no instrument in their hands to counter street riots. OMON squads for such things would not be created until three decades later. As a result, irresponsibility and mass hysteria led to tragedy.
