Why would he believe in him ? No, really ? Do you even know what 22 June 1941 was?
No, of course, because you are armed with post-knowledge...
You do not realize, for neither before nor after anything like this in history was even close. And not even in scale (it’s self-evident), but in everything else: the degree of ambition, treachery, madness, destruction and blood. It is not for nothing that Hitler has firmly established himself as "the most reckless criminal in human history" (a quote from his best-known Western biographer). Stalin, as an ultra-pragmatic and sober to the core politician (and man) could not even honestly imagine that Hitler would take without any reason (and in front of the world) and untie a meat chop of apocalyptic scale (even from the point of view of his own soldiers). And all this, I would like to point out, by spreading its forces throughout the occupied Europe (as well as with the ill-fated Britain behind it). It is no wonder that Stalin underestimated Hitler. I would have done the same in his place.
By the way, not only Stalin, even many German soldiers were genuinely surprised to learn that a day later they start war with the "friendly" then Russia...
Again, even with all the initial successes, Hitler’s war from the beginning was pure madness. And a disaster. Not so much for himself (he, on the other hand, thought only of historical greatness, for which he was ready to sacrifice his life) as for his people and state. Stalin, like many western "partners" before him, simply did not see the maniac in Hitler, completely devoid of instinct for self-preservation, which can easily (playfully!) decide to do this. All of them in their time tried to ride the "mad fuhrer" until they themselves became his victims.
In addition, Stalin, as a man of his time, believed that to start a war you must first create some conditions, even if ephemeral. As indeed was with the main Hitler victims. Before the same campaign in Poland, Hitler had been attacking the Poles for half a year until he broke the Pact and came to blows with them. The sudden attack on France took place within the framework of an earlier declared war by Germany. There were also conditions for the invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia. Only the attack on Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and Norway can be compared in any way to an attack on the USSR. But it is one thing to occupy these dwarf herbivorous countries (in addition, lying on the tracks of war with England), and another - try to take over the vast USSR, with its multimillion (even low-valued) army with thousands of tanks, aircraft and... elementary cities, that you need to occupy first, and then someone else to control. " Seen by the "Soviet intelligence" 127 German divisions on the border for such large-scale tasks were clearly not suitable...
At the same time, Hitler himself as the greatest adventurer in world history was well aware of this logic, fully implementing it. He openly and unabashedly played on Stalin’s belief in strategic logic, and decided on a war of archi-risk (even before the defeat of England) largely because such a war seemed impossible to Stalin himself. During one of the spring meetings in 1941, he explicitly said that if the war with England continued, the surprise effect for Russia would be lost. After the defeat of "Foggy Albion", the next German move would be obvious. " This means that the attack on Russia must take place before the destruction of Britain," he repeated once again. So uncunningly Hitler sold his military main goal of all his political life, although they have already noticed that the Fuhrer’s enterprise gives up pure adventurism (to say the least).
By the way, do you know why I just brought it up?
Now, again I stumbled upon another article called "oh, how could Stalin stage a German attack?". It came out on one super-twisted Zenov channel, but none of the thousands of commentators behind it thought about how fantastic the possibility of a Hitler invasion until June 22 should have looked to Stalin. Again, it is the whole post-knowledge effect that distorts us the real picture of those days. He also loses the uniqueness of Hitler’s "Barbarossa". It is unwittingly reduced to some commonplace (although in all of human history it has only been so once!).
It is precisely this Stalinist mistrust that explains the position of the Soviet forces on the border towards the beginning of the Hitler invasion. Stalin’s leadership was preparing for "ordinary war", drawing troops to the border and preparing them for a defensive attack - a fashionable hobby of any self-respecting army of those days. By "ordinary war," I mean above all the algorithm of actions that have been common for centuries, such as the gradual deterioration of relations between the parties, the presentation of claims and ultimatums, some kind of declaration of war (or at least denunciation of a non-aggression pact). And only after all this did the actual fighting begin. This is what they were preparing for, believing to the last that rumors of a sudden attack either British provocation (do not forget, Stalin believed only in logic) or blackmail of the Germans themselves (for example, to increase supplies of necessary raw materials, food and everything).
The Hitlers themselves, in preparation for their greatest adventure in history, skillfully played on Stalinist waiting, deliberately heating up diplomatic rumors about a German ultimatum to allow their troops into the Middle East (through USSR territory) and the surrender of Ukraine to German exploitation for 50 years. Although this had another purpose: in the run-up to the invasion, lure as many Soviet troops as possible to the border (after all, Stalin acted according to a predictable algorithm).
And in Berlin, meanwhile, continued "brainwashing". So, on June 14, 1941. Goebbels wrote in his diary:
... I again spread in Berlin the most incredible rumors: Stalin arrives in Berlin, red flags will be hung up and so on. Dr. Ley called. He believed it all. I did not try to dissuade him. At present, all this has one purpose...
June 16, 1941. Goebbels met with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, after which he wrote in his diary that now "procedure" will be conducted in a new way:
... So, to achieve victory it is necessary to create other conditions of security. The procedure should be as follows: we will go a completely different way than usual, and this time we will speak differently: we will not question the press, sink into deep silence, and on X-day we will just strike...
In my opinion, the essence of the invasion on June 22, 1941 is not clearer. Or rather, "procedure" as shamefully described it by the father of lies itself. I think. Note that the Nazis themselves considered this tactic to be unlike anything, their "know-how". It is no wonder that Stalin did not believe in all this to the last...