While the unnoticed events, the whole world was witnessing the story of the hijacking of a passenger airliner.

 

The 186-meter transatlantic liner "Santa Maria" built in the early 50's in Belgium belonged to the Lisbon-based company "Colonial de Navegasan" and worked on passenger lines connecting Portugal with the United States and Latin America. On January 9, 1961, the Santa Maria departed Lisbon for another voyage to Miami. On board were 612 passengers, many of them U.S. citizens, and 300 crew members.

At 5 p.m. on Monday, January 23, the ship's agent in Miami received a radiogram from the Santa Maria that due to "engine problems" the ship would not be able to arrive in Miami on schedule. This was of no concern to anyone - engine problems and related delays were commonplace for the Santa Maria.

On the evening of the same day, the "Santa Maria" appeared in the outer roadstead of Castries, the capital of St. Lucia, and launched a dinghy. The dinghy buried itself against the shore and the "Santa Maria" departed at full speed.

A small crowd met the dinghy on shore, a few sailors shouted something excitedly in Portuguese, but the locals did not understand them. Eventually one of the sailors was able to utter in English, "Pirates! We've been hijacked by pirates!" The crowd took it as a joke at first.

Around midnight, international news agencies carried breaking news of an "act of piracy" in the Caribbean Sea.

On January 23, Portugal called for help from the U.S., Britain and Spain.

On January 24, a search operation for the Santa Maria unfolded in the Caribbean Sea. From St. Lucia on the trail of the liner in the direction of Miami moved the British ASW frigate "Rothesay", from Barbados to search for 4-re Hunter, 3 "Neptune" and 2 seaplanes "Albatross" Royal Air Force.

From Puerto Rico, two U.S. destroyers "Wilson" and "Damato" came to the search, sent a pair of search planes. Venezuelan airplanes also joined the search

Due to poor visibility, the search on the first day ended in nothing.

By evening, the situation changed dramatically. On the radio was transmitted an official address of the head of the seized ship "Revolutionary Directorate of Iberian Liberation" Captain Enrico Galvan.

Galvan, 61, was a prominent opposition figure. Having chosen an early military career, he took part in the 1926 coup and was a staunch supporter of the New State. From the 30s he worked in the colonial administration in Angola and wrote a number of brilliant books about nature and life in Angola.
But in the late 40's, as a deputy to the National Assembly from Angola, made a great report condemning the system of "slave" forced labor in the colonies, went into opposition.

In 1952, he was arrested on corruption charges and dismissed from the army. In 1959, he left the country and was granted political asylum in Venezuela. There he established contacts with General Humberto Delgado, an exiled Brazilian general and opposition candidate in the 1958 presidential election.

Together they planned Operation Dulcinea. From October 1960, preparations were underway. The operation involved 24 Portuguese and Spanish political émigrés.

January 20, 1961, several of them under the guise of ordinary passengers boarded the "Santa Maria" in the Venezuelan port of La Guairá, the next day they ensured the penetration of the ship in Curaçao the rest of the group led by Galván, weapons carried in suitcases.

 

Late in the evening of January 22, members of the group seized the bridge, shooting the duty officer João José Nascimento Costa and wounding two others. They took control of the radio station, locked senior officers in their quarters, and changed course for Africa.

The plan was to seize the Spanish colony of Fernando Po to use it as a base, then attack Luanda with the help of local supporters, where they would establish a revolutionary government in Portugal. Galvan himself, in his book My Crusade for Portugal, admits that the plan was "a mixture of megalomania and donnishness," but says that the group's main goal was "to draw international attention to Salazar's dictatorship."

On January 24, Galvan delivered an address "on behalf of the Independent National Liberation Council, led by His Excellency General Humberto Delgado, who was elected President of the Portuguese Republic but was fraudulently deprived of his rights by the Salazar government."

After guaranteeing the safety of the passengers, Galvan called his actions the beginning of an uprising against "Salazar's tyrannical and totalitarian rule," proclaimed the ship "the first liberated part of Portuguese territory," and renamed it "Santa Liberdade."

At the same time, Delgado himself held a press conference in Brazil. He confirmed that Galvan and his crew had acted in agreement with him, called what had happened "not a mutiny or piracy, but the seizure of a Portuguese ship by the Portuguese for Portuguese political purposes" and denied any links with revolutionary Cuba - "What has Cuba got to do with it?".

A group of Portuguese political migrants in London appealed to the U.S. and British governments not to intervene in the incident, which was "a protest against the fascist regime in Portugal, which has suppressed any dissent for 35 years."

For Lisbon, the situation was obvious. The government declared that "those who seized the Santa Maria are not politicians or ideologues, but simple bandits" and "the entire civilized world" had a duty to suppress their actions. Galvan was called a "communist" and a "madman" by the Portuguese newspapers. But for the rest of the world it was not so clear. It appeared that this was not an act of piracy, but an act of armed rebellion against the government, and therefore the intervention of the military of other countries became an interference in the internal affairs of Portugal. After Galvan and Delgado's statement, hijacking of the Santa Maria  did not look like a "pure act of piracy".

While diplomats debated how to qualify what had happened, there was a flood of radiograms from the Santa Maria, which were messages from passengers to their relatives, assuring them that they were all right and that the only thing they feared was that the Santa Maria might be attacked by Portuguese ships and sunk with all the passengers. This also played into Galvan's hands.

Late in the afternoon of January 25, 1961, the Danish merchant ship Viveke Gulva spotted the Santa Maria 400 nautical miles east of Guadeloupe. On receipt of the information, an American patrol plane, the Neptune, was dispatched to the spot.

It was almost dark when the plane's pilot, U.S. Navy Lt. Daniel Krauss, spotted the ship 900 miles east of Trinidad, heading east at 15 knots. He descended to an altitude of 800 feet and even saw the painted name on the side.

After contacting the ship by radio, Krauss relayed orders from Admiral Robert E. Lee Dennison, the commander of the operation, to change course to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Galvan refused, confirming that he was headed for Angola. And agreed to accept on board authorized representatives of the United States or any country other than Portugal and Spain. After that, in succession, the American "Neptunes" continued to lead the ship. The destroyers Gearing and Vogelson, off the coast of West Africa, carrying Gulf Company, 2nd Battalion, 6th Regiment, Marine Corps, and the submarine Sea Wolf, were headed toward it.

In reporting the discovery of the ship, U.S. State Department spokesman Lincoln White said, "The facts regarding the capture of the Santa Maria are not entirely clear. The information is contradictory ... and does not allow for a clear conclusion that an act of piracy under international convention has been committed." Britain withdrew from the operation altogether, recalling the destroyer and aircraft to base.

Galvan continued to negotiate by radio with Admiral Dennison about the fate of the passengers. Galvan offered to reload them onto American ships on the high seas or, upon reaching West Africa, to disembark them in one of the ports before continuing their voyage. The Americans suggested disembarking the passengers at a port in northern South America. The closest was Brazil. Brazilian President Kubitschek had a good relationship with Salazar, but on January 31, 1961 he was replaced by the much more leftist Janio Cuadros, who openly supported Fidel Castro.
Public opinion in Brazil was also on the side of Galvão and Delgado. "Esitado de São Paulo" wrote in an editorial: "We have no doubt that the Latin American public condemns such a fact of cooperation between two democracies[Britain and the United States] with one of the most repressive and anachronistic dictatorships in the world."

On Saturday, January 28, the Neptune, which had been tracking the Santa Maria, reported that the ship abruptly changed course and turned toward Brazil. Apparently, there was simply not enough fuel and supplies on board to reach Africa.

Galvan told the Americans that he was ready to go to "any Brazilian port" where he would unload the passengers, refuel, and continue on to Africa. But only requires guarantees that he will not be prevented from continuing his mission after disembarking the passengers.

It is agreed that Rear Admiral Alain Smith, commander of the Caribbean Sea Frontier, will arrive aboard the destroyer Gearing to negotiate directly with Galvan. On January 30, at a large press conference in Rio de Janeiro, incoming President Cuadros called Galvan his "old friend" and assured him that he would give him any "guarantees required."

What worried the U.S. most at this point was that there were three modern Portuguese warships in the Atlantic, including the fast frigate Peru Escobar, which could overtake and sink the Santa Maria.

The Portuguese Chief of General Staff, General Beléz Ferrar, expressed concern that the Santa Maria would head for the Cape Verde Islands or Portuguese Guinea. "Peru Escobar" was sent to the Cape Verde Islands. On January 26, four Neptune patrol planes of the 61st Air Force Squadron, recently purchased from the Dutch, were flown to Sal Island in the archipelago. The next day they began patrol flights.

Spain expressed its willingness to help, and the heavy cruiser Gran Canaria with 2 destroyers set out from Cadiz to join the Portuguese ships to the Cape Verde Islands, although it could not make it in time.

On January 27, after a meeting with Salazar, General Ferrar gave final orders to Commodore Laurindo dos Santos, who commanded the operation. Portuguese ships and aircraft were instructed to monitor the situation, leaving the task of stopping the Santa Maria to the Americans. In the event that they did not, for whatever reason, do as expected, the Portuguese were to intervene. The goal was to prevent the Santa Maria from reaching any part of Portuguese Africa at all costs.

Gradually Lisbon had more and more questions about the behavior of the American allies.