On April 12, 1798, the Directory signed a decree on the formation of the Eastern Army, which was to be commanded by Napoleon Bonaparte. After the defeats of the French fleet at sea, the only chance to defeat Britain was to strike at its eastern colonies - so believed the triumphant Italian campaign.

Napoleon proposed a bold plan. Suddenly land in Egypt, and from there with an expeditionary corps to make a march to the Middle East and India. Members of the Directory, as well as the highest revolutionary generals, did not believe in the success of this enterprise. Britain completely dominated the waters of the Mediterranean Sea, and for the expedition Bonaparte was allocated too few forces.

Bonaparte was not discouraged, continuing to pelt the government with his far-reaching plans and projects to crush the British Empire. Napoleon was at that point too popular with the people, the army and among the revolutionary forces. For these reasons, the revolutionary upper class eventually acceded to the demands of the divisional general. The Directory hoped that the ambitious and super-talented general would never return from the Eastern campaign.

The French squadron left home shores on May 19. At Napoleon's disposal were 23 warships with 1,354 naval guns and 400 transport ships. The total strength of the expeditionary force was 35,000 men - 33,397 soldiers and officers. In addition, on the decks of the squadron were 10,000 crew members and 1,603 non-combatants (scientists, officials, intendants, engineers).

It was only by luck that the expedition was not overtaken by Admiral Nelson's flotilla. The formidable English admiral at that moment in vain furrowed the waters of the Mediterranean near Gibraltar in search of enemy ships. Worked disinformation Napoleon, convincing the enemy that the purpose of his campaign the coast of Spain.

June 9, Napoleon reached Malta, where he left part of the forces to replenish the garrison. July 1, the French army landed on the land of the Pharaohs, seizing the capital of Egypt - Alexandria the next day. The indefatigable Bonaparte moved directly on Cairo. The influential Mamluk rulers - Ibrahim-bey and Murad-bey decided to attack the aliens on the march and defeat them.

On July 5, in the first skirmish near Rahmania, a detachment of General L. Desaix routed one of the Mamluk hordes. On July 13, Napoleon himself dispersed Murad-bey's cavalry with cartridges at Shubrakhit (Shebreis). Six days later the French army entered the Pyramid Valley.

July 21, 1798 about 8 a.m. French army reached the bend of the Nile north of the village of Tannah. Behind it could be seen the outskirts of Cairo and towering over the city of 400 minarets. Less than an hour later, intelligence reported to Napoleon that on the outskirts of the Egyptian capital gathered tens of thousands of armed Muslims.

The army of Murad-bey, who led the defense of Cairo, positioned on the left bank of the Nile along the line Embabeh village (Emamba) - the village of Mit-Okba - the village of Al-Matamdia (pyramids). On the right flank, in a fortified camp around Embabeh, there was a concentration of Janissaries on foot, Arabs and Cairo militiamen - up to 20,000 men in all, with 40 naval guns.

In the center (around Mit-Okb) stood the selected Mamluk cavalry - 12,000 horsemen. Each of them had 3-4 foot armed servants. Thus, up to 50,000 armed men gathered in the center. On the left flank, extending all the way to the pyramids, were 8,000 mounted Bedouins.

On the right bank of the Nile (north of the Cairo suburb of Bulak), opposite Embabeh was the camp of Ibrahim-bey. The Nile bend around the northwestern outskirts of Cairo was packed with Egyptian ships. They had to quickly ferry their warriors to the right bank in case of failure. On the right bank of the Nile was almost the entire population of the Egyptian capital. The people gathered to watch with their own eyes how the “faithful Muslims” would easily and quickly destroy the “infidels”.

Napoleon had about 21,000 men in formation with 42 guns. The general realized that any outcome of the battle, except for victory, would be ruin for his army and the expedition as a whole. The hero of the Italian campaign had to attack and defeat the army, which had a total superiority of four times and even greater advantage in cavalry.

Intelligence reported that the camp at Embabeh was surrounded by trenches. For cavalry they were a serious obstacle, but the infantry, which had a great deal of combat experience, could overcome them without difficulty. Arabs and Cairo militia represented a rather weak fighting force, and the ship's cannons were not suitable for maneuver shooting.

Bonaparte decided to hit the right wing of the enemy division of General Dugua, the divisions of Generals Desaix and Reynier was to attack the Mamelukes. If the Egyptian horsemen tried to go on the counterattack, the Mamelukes in the flank was to hit General Beaune. In reserve was a division of General Vial and cavalry Murat.

The first forward on the enemy center went to the parts of General Desaix (21 th Light, as well as 61 th and 88 th line half-brigade). Behind him moved Reinier's division (9th and 85th Linear Half Brigades). Next, at some distance from each other came the divisions of Dugua (2nd Light, as well as 25th and 75th Line Half Brigades; here was Napoleon with his headquarters) and Bona (4th Light, as well as the 18th and 32nd Line Half Brigades).

The divisions moved in marching columns. Murad-bey, noticing the advance of the enemy, immediately decided to attack the enemy's foot columns on the march. Mamluk cavalry (7000-8000 horsemen) with whistling and hooting unstructured masses, mottled with green banners, rushed to the French.

Cairo's crowds cheered the attack. None of the Egyptians doubted that the Mamelukes would crush the conquerors. However, the French divisions instantly formed a carriage 300 meters across the front and 50 meters deep. Inside there was a small number of cavalry, headquarters and wagons, on the flanks and corners placed artillery.

General Bona's division formed a carriage south of the village of Ouarak-al-Khader, Dugua's division near the village of Ouarak-al-Arab, Vial's division between Generals Bona and Dugua, and Desaix's and Reynier's divisions east of the village of Betkhil. The mounted lava began to flow in a living river around the enemy's cavalry in the hope of encircling them and cutting them off.

The Egyptians had never before encountered such a formation of infantry and cannon, which allowed them to fire guns and cannon at point-blank range from all four sides. As fiercely and recklessly the Mamelukes rushed at the enemy, as fiercely and mercilessly the French showered them with buckshot, cannonballs and bullets.

Each such volley mowed down dozens and hundreds of Muslims. Only the most courageous of them reached the front ranks of the cavalry, but there a thicket of bayonets glistening in the sun awaited them. A dozen dashing Mamluk beys and kiashifs (the officer rank of the Egyptian militia) broke into the infantry line and even made their way to the opposite flank.

However, these localized successes could not change the disastrous situation for Murad Bey. The whole surrounding district was strewn with hundreds of dead men and horses. Firing in all directions, the French divisions ravaged the Mamelukes both from the front, flanks and rear. Such destruction brave Mamelukes could not long endure. The defeated and very thinned Muslim cavalry rushed back.

Half of the Mamelukes rushed after Murad-bey to their center, the other part of the horsemen tried to make their way directly to the camp at Embabeh. However, their way was blocked by General Bona's division. It managed during the battle to advance from Ouarak-al-Khader along the left bank of the Nile to the northern outskirts of Embabeh.

At the same time, Dugua's division advanced from Ouarak-al-Arab to the northwestern outskirts of Embabeh. The Mamluks were thus caught in a “corridor of fire” between the two French divisions. Killing volleys of buckshot and bullets finally dispersed the Egyptian cavalry. The surviving riders in panic and despair threw themselves into the waters of the Nile, preferring to drown than to be captured by the “infidels”.

At this time Vial's division and General Rampon with two battalions of direct fire began shelling the western outskirts of the camp at Embabeh and the village itself. By now the camp was virtually deserted. The fact is that the Egyptian infantry, seeing the defeat of their cavalry, began to hastily cross the Nile by boat to the outskirts of Cairo.

Murad-bey gathered the remnants of his cavalry and tried to retake the lost camp, but each of his attacks was met with a barrage of buckshot. The finally defeated Egyptian cavalry swept northward toward Giza. By evening the divisions of Beaune and Dugua had advanced close to the banks of the Nile. The persistent generals destroyed part of the Egyptian flotilla opposite the island of Bulak.

Already in the darkness of Cairo, discouraged by the complete defeat of his army, began to hastily leave the capital. Egyptians in despair hid their wealth, some set fire to their own houses and surviving ships. Ibrahim-bey barely gathered 1200 horsemen for further defense of Cairo, but at night, realizing the futility of further resistance, left to the Syrian border.

Murad-bey had only 3,000 men left on hand. Some 10,000 Egyptians, Mamelukes, Arabs and Janissaries were killed, drowned, died of wounds or were captured. All 40 of the ship's cannon fell into French hands. Napoleon's irrecoverable losses amounted to only 300 men. After his momentous victory at the Pyramids, General Bonaparte entered Cairo on July 22, 1798.